[dude1394]

Another posting on Al Queda's strategies. What's quite interesting in this (if true) is how Al Queda uses the home political side as a formidable weapon.

http://engram-backtalk.blogspot.com/...culations.html

Are you unimpressed with al Qaeda? Then consider this, which I came across when a reader alerted me to Robert Pape:

In September 2003 al-Qaida published a 42 page strategy document on radical web sites about how to deal with the United States given Iraq. The document says directly that with Iraq, al-Qaida should not seek to attack the American homeland in the short term, but instead should focus on stripping the United States of its military allies, especially in Iraq.

Then the document goes on, this is in the fall of ’03, the length of 42 pages, to assess whether they should hit Spain, Britain, or Poland. They conclude they should hit Spain in Madrid just before the March 2004 elections because that would be the attack most likely to knock Spanish forces out of Iraq and put pressure on the British in Iraq.


I disagree with Pape's overall analysis, which is that we are causing the suicide bomber epidemic because of the presence of American forces in Muslim countries (I agree with this part, and so do Islamic radicals), so all we need to do is withdraw our forces from those countries and the suicide bombers will dry up (this strikes me as wishful thinking in the extreme). But my main point concerns al Qaeda's insight into the Spanish people. If this 42-page document really exists, then it seems that the Spanish people really were puppets on the strings of al Qaeda. It would be undeniable.

I went searching for information on the authenticity of this document, and I found a further analysis of it here. It seems likely that it really exists and that it really did foreshadow subsequent events:

The document then analyses three countries (Britain, Spain and Poland) in depth, with a view to identifying the weakest link or the domino piece most likely to fall first. The author provides a surprisingly informed and nuanced analysis of the domestic political map in each country. He argues that each country will react differently to violent attacks against its forces because of domestic political factors:

Poland, for example, is unlikely to withdraw from the coalition because there is political consensus on foreign policy, and the country has a very high tolerance for human casualties.

Britain is easier to force out of Iraq, because the popular opposition to the war and the occupation is so high. However, the author estimates that Britain will only withdraw from Iraq in one of two cases: either if Britain suffers significant human casualties in Iraq or if Spain and Italy withdraws first.

Spain on the other hand is very vulnerable to attacks on its forces, primarily because public opposition to the war is almost total, and the government is virtually on its own on this issue. The author therefore identifies Spain as the weakest link in the coalition....

The author devotes 6 out of 42 pages to a review of the domestic political situation in Spain. In the process he displays a knowledge of and interest in Spanish society which is striking. We do not know whether the author himself has intimate knowledge of Spanish politics or whether he is plagiarising good secondary sources. However, the very fact that he deems such a high level of detail necessary for his argument indicates that we are dealing with a politically very developed mind. It must also be noted that of the three case studies, the chapter on Spain is by far the best in terms of analytical clarity.


And here is an interesting translation of a critical part of the document:

Therefore we say that in order to force the Spanish government to withdraw from Iraq the resistance should deal painful blows to its forces. This should be accompanied by an information campaign clarifying the truth of the matter inside Iraq. It is necessary to make utmost use of the upcoming general election in Spain in March next year.

We think that the Spanish government could not tolerate more than two, maximum three blows, after which it will have to withdraw as a result of popular pressure. If its troops still remain in Iraq after these blows, then the victory of the Socialist Party is almost secured, and the withdrawal of the Spanish forces will be on its electoral programme.

Lastly, we are emphasise that a withdrawal of the Spanish or Italian forces from Iraq would put huge pressure on the British presence (in Iraq), a pressure that Toni Blair might not be able to withstand, and hence the domino tiles would fall quickly. Yet, the basic problem of making the first tile fall still remains."


Al Qaeda killed nearly 200 Spanish commuters on 3/11 2004, and Spanish voters immediately behaved in exact accordance with al Qaeda's predictions. Shortly after the attack, al Qaeda released a videotape that said this:

We declare our responsibility for what happened in Madrid exactly two-and-a-half years after the attacks on New York and Washington.

It is a response to your collaboration with the criminals Bush and his allies.


Al Qaeda's strategic planning is undeniably impressive. All of this calls to mind another letter, this one from Zarqawi, in which he accurately predicted that striking out at the Shiites and their mosques would bring the Shiite militias into the battle:

As for the Shi'a, we will undertake suicide operations and use car bombs to harm them...

So I say again, the only solution is to strike the religious, military, and other cadres of the Shi'a so that they revolt against the Sunnis. Some people will say, that this will be a reckless and irresponsible action that will bring the Islamic nation to a battle for which the Islamic nation is unprepared. Souls will perish and blood will be spilled.

This is, however, exactly what we want...


And, of course, al Qaeda made good on their promise to attack Shiites, and the Shiites -- like the Spanish -- cooperated fully with al Qaeda's devious plans. Again, if you are not impressed by al Qaeda, then you are not easily impressed.

What is al Qaeda saying about America in its internal communiques today? I don't really know, but I wish I did. Their earlier claims about America being a "paper tiger" in light of its withdrawal under fire from Somalia have not yet been vindicated by our reaction to the strategy they have adopted in Iraq. The campaign there was supposed to force the Sunnis to turn to al Qaeda for help while rendering American forces simply irrelevant. The Shiite militias joined the battle (just as they were supposed to do), but the Sunnis, with help from the troop surge, have now turned hard against al Qaeda in Iraq (not towards them). That was not part of the plan. And the troop surge probably wasn't either, though it is hard to tell for sure. Al Qaeda's public bravado welcomes the troop surge, but in light of the changes that have taken place over the last few months, al Qaeda cannot really be celebrating. They have successfully turned American public opinion against the war, but it seems less and less likely that Harry Reid is going to dictate what comes next. That cannot be good news for al Qaeda, and I wish I knew what they were saying about it. Someday, a captured document may let us know.