Missing in action: Kerry's complete strategy for Iraq
It all sounds so good and plausible and logical. Democratic presidential candidate John Kerry, so say his advisers, didn't dwell much on his plans for Iraq at last month's convention — a turn-away-and-you-miss-them 55 words or so in a 45-minute speech — for good reason. The nation, they say, needed to get acquainted with him as a person. So it was more about biography: presenting the Vietnam War hero, the man who would transfer his courage under fire to the tough role of commander in chief.
That is the norm for conventions. But take a trip to
www.johnkerry.com, Kerry's campaign Web site, and just what a President Kerry might do in Iraq remains elusive.
The reasons have partly to do with the politics of the Democratic Party, which is torn between the many who opposed the war in the first place and the few, like Kerry himself, who supported it. But the result is that with the election just three months away, Kerry has done little to separate his views from those of President Bush.
Both want more international military and financial help, a stable and relatively democratic government, an intensive training of Iraqi security forces and a gradual drawdown of U.S. troops. But who wouldn't? The question is how to get there.
Kerry's main difference with Bush, and one he underscores, is that he would be better able to get other countries to help by returning to a more traditional inclusiveness. Involving allies heavily in everything from reconstruction to discussions on Iraq's future, Kerry says, is the way to bring more international troops to Iraq, lessen anti-U.S. hostility and start bringing U.S. troops home.
Kerry might, indeed, be better received than Bush, who has angered allies by trying to dictate policies from Iraq to global warming. But help in Iraq isn't likely to be on the way anytime soon — at least not in numbers that would change the U.S. burden.
Since the Cold War, Europe has slashed defense budgets, and NATO already is stretched thin stabilizing Afghanistan. Even if more forces were found, the question remains: How would their inevitably small numbers change the role of the 140,000 U.S. troops already there?
Kerry suggests that they might be used to train Iraqi troops and patrol Iraq's borders, but that, presumably, would leave the U.S. to fight the insurgency until an Iraqi force could manage on its own.
Nor are Muslim forces the answer. They could even exacerbate the problem. Workers from Muslim countries are already being targeted by hostage-takers.
Politically, the war's unpopularity in both Europe and the Muslim world gives their leaders powerful political incentives to stay out. Kerry suggests that sharing economic opportunities, such as oil contracts, would bring others in. But so far, the insurgency is driving companies away, even those from areas eager to share in the contracts, such as Turkey.
Bush faces the same issues, of course, but he is forced to defend his actions frequently. Challengers prefer to camp out in the chorus of critics and offer generalized solutions.
Thirty-six years ago, Republican candidate Richard Nixon made a similar pitch for ending the Vietnam War: He slammed the Democrats as incompetent, called on allies to bear more of the burden and suggested that he had a plan to end the war that he couldn't disclose until he was in office.
Four years later, he still had no answer.
Iraq isn't Vietnam, and Kerry's plan isn't quite as opaque as Nixon's, but the historical echoes are strong enough to suggest that if Kerry has a credible proposal for Iraq, he needs to fill in the blanks.